

Covenants



It is often in the public interest for land to be designated for a particular use. This is frequently contrary to the private interests of the [most efficient user of the land](#) and the public interest of [ground rent](#) maximization. Without an explicit [constitutional exception](#) for creating [dominion](#) covenants, they would be forbidden.

While a dominion covenant would appear to hamper [trebling](#), it might not. Although it materially decreases the likelihood of a treble within the dominion, it increases the likelihood of a [dominion treble](#).

For instance, suppose a conservationist trebles free land in a wetland area with the purpose of protecting it. They approach the dominion, and by a 2/3 plurality of the direct democracy, the dominion creates a covenant designating these 40 acres of somewhat prime development land as a protected wetland. The cost of the treble was the nominal \$40 (\$1/acre).

Within one year's time, the land can once again be trebled for the minimum of \$40. Nobody will do so, because the dominion, at the [property owner's](#) behest, created a covenant preserving the land as a wetland. A wetland foundation might treble the land and raise the rent to protect it from developers.

Why would they need to protect it? After all, it is already protected by the dominion covenant. However, the covenant is in effect only when the wetland is part of the dominion that created the covenant.

Suppose the wetland is on the dominion border. A dominion treble from a neighboring dominion captures the wetland into the neighboring dominion.

The dominion treble might be in the amount of \$500,000, making a match by the wetland foundation unlikely (they have 3 days to come up with the money). The trebling developer is no longer bound by the covenant.

Proximity to the border is inversely related to safety. After all, the developer might find an inexpensive pathway to the wetland and treble through it.

The higher the [level of dominion](#), the more protected the covenant. A covenant at the level of [federation](#), by definition, cannot be broken by a dominion treble. However, obtaining a 2/3 plurality at high levels is a more difficult undertaking.

Note that covenants do not apply to roads and grids. They can be trebled under the doctrine of [access rights](#).

Schools, municipal buildings, zoos, and other typical properties under covenant are unlikely to be dominion trebled due to the [33% premium on structures](#). Nevertheless, the closer they are to the center of the dominion, the lower the rent can be allowed to fall.

Covenants can increase the minimum lot dimensions established by the [VLM](#). However, a dominion trebler cannot be restrained from taking a minimum lot-sized bite out of the property.

Because covenants are passed by a 2/3 plurality of the [direct democracy](#), they must be based on preventing what a [reasonable person](#) would consider a negative externality. For instance, covenants that discriminate against a class of people are [class III](#). Most zoning is acceptable if a negative externality from breaking the theme can be articulated.

Covenants, like all legislation, include a punishment for violations. Typical punishment might include a warning and rectification for the first violation, a day in the penitentiary for the second, 2 days for the third, 4 days for the fourth, and so on.

Fines, as direct punishment, are class III and are not used outside of [sovereignties](#). However, with the agreement of the offender, the victim(s), and the level 2 judiciary, penitentiary time can be negotiated into a fine, a community service, or other punishment.

Covenants can include features encouraging private ownership, such as concession rights at zoos, or cafeteria rights in municipal buildings. The covenant might relieve the private owner of a large portion of the building's utility costs.

In addition to the dominion treble and switching allegiance, people [vote with their feet](#), taking their basket of [Earth Dividend](#) distributions with them. Dominions with burdensome covenants might lose the third of the population who voted "no".

For instance, Yellowstone Park has 2,219,823 acres. The nominal ground rent for the land is \$26.4 million. The U.S. government probably sold this into a commons trust during the [VIP\\$ hyperdeflation](#) of [Phase II](#), with the promise of a covenant by the local dominion. Park revenue from entrance fees, donations, license fees, park pass distributions, and vendor fees makes Yellowstone a candidate for trebling, within the covenant.